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Radha A. Pathak* & Brendan S. Maher**
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) occasioned a constitutional feder-
alism dispute, and there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's
ruling on the validity of the ACA deserves considerable attention.'
In our view, however, no federalism analysis of the ACA (or any federal
statute) is complete without a consideration of how the legislation
inhibits-or does not inhibit-the real exercise of state power. That
is, rather than devoting exclusive attention to the Court's appraisal
of the ACA's legitimacy from the perspective of constitutional federal-
ism, the ACA should be analyzed from the perspective of "federalism-
in-fact": the degree to which regulatory power is actually shared be-
tween federal and state governments. This article begins the analysis
by focusing on the ACA's central feature-the regulation of private
health insurance, which heretofore has been most heavily regulated
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2
This article contends that when the ACA's own impact on regulation
of private health insurance is analyzed, especially when such impact
is compared to the extent ERISA had already federalized the regu-
lation of private health insurance, it becomes clear that the ACA in-
trudes less upon state power than conventional accounts recognize.
I. A Proposed Metric: Sickness and Non-Sickness Rules
Our proposed manner of evaluating the ACA's effect on state
power is to consider its effect on the two broad categories of rules
that comprise the universe of all regulation of private health insur-
ance: "sickness rules" and "non-sickness rules." As Professor Maher
has explained elsewhere, private health insurance is a bargain be-
tween the insured and the insurer.' Bargains involve some substan-
*Associate Professor, Whittier Law School; J.D. New York University School of
Law; B.A. University of California, Berkeley. Thanks to James Morris for his excellent
research assistance on this project and others.
**Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law
School; A.B. Stanford University.
1. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829.
3. See Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1733,
1744-49 (2011) (explaining how insurance is a bargain between insured and insurer).
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tive exchange between the parties-that substantive exchange is the
core thing that motivated the parties to start bargaining in the first
place. A health insurance bargain's core content is coverage: what
medical conditions and treatments will be covered by the policy? In-
sureds are interested in obtaining insurance because it offers cover-
age, and insurers are interested in offering a price that depends, in
largest part, on the content of the coverage. We describe legal rules
that govern such coverage content as sickness rules.
Health bargains also implicate many matters other than coverage,
such as questions of remedy, review, notice, and funding. These mat-
ters are not the primary reason health insurance bargains are pursued
in the first instance, but they are of crucial importance in consummat-
ing, performing, and enforcing the bargain. There is no perfect term
for this category of items. We label them simply in deference to what
they are not. They are not legal rules that specify what conditions or
treatments are covered, so we call them non-sickness rules.
States have long expressed a desire to regulate sickness rules, and
for some states, these rules are the central matters it may wish to reg-
ulate.4 Thus, states have enacted "direct" regulation of sickness rules
(for example, "mandated coverage" or "required benefit" rules) that
specify that a particular condition or a particular type of treatment
must be covered.5 However, such direct regulation is only one aspect
of the regulatory scheme because the inherent nature of health insur-
ance limits the efficacy of such direct regulation. Most insurance poli-
cies premise coverage on treatment that is "medically necessary,"6 and
the determination of "medical necessity" does not lend itself to precise
ex ante specification,' so non-sickness rules attain special significance.
Conceptually, there are two ways in which a health insurer's
payment obligation could work: as an indemnity or non-indemnity ob-
ligation. Indemnity has different meanings in different contexts, but
we are using a particular definition here: an indemnity arrangement
ties the insurer's payment obligation to the insured's actual loss.8 In
4. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Fairness versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content
Regulation, 12 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 144, 147 n.34 (2012) (describing content regulation as
a "high stakes" affair).
5. Id. at 147 (states average approximately eighteen mandated benefit rules each,
with a low of two in Idaho and thirty-five in California).
6. William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit,
and the Goals ofAdministrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597,599 (2003).
7. Cf Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 433, 462 (2010) (uncertainty as to the meaning of medical necessity "dwarfs" the un-
certainty present in other benefit promises).
8. For example, under a motor vehicle insurance contract, the insurer's loss obliga-
tion includes paying for the repair for physical damage to the insured's vehicle as well as
physical damage to the vehicle of another driver that was caused in an accident and for
which the insured is legally responsible. A non-indemnity motor vehicle insurance
arrangement would pay a lump sum for any accident, no matter how severe.
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contrast, a non-indemnity payout is a predetermined sum paid upon the
occurrence of a triggering loss event, without regard to the loss incurred
in fact by the insured. Accordingly, non-indemnity insurance includes a
determination, ex ante, of the insurer's cost (payout) associated with the
covered loss; indemnity insurance requires a determination, ex post, of
the insurer's cost (payout) associated with the covered loss.
Non-indemnity health insurance-in which the insurance payout
is a fixed sum based on the triggering event-is impracticable for
many reasons, not the least of which is that there are so many medical
conditions and corresponding treatments. A comprehensive non-
indemnity policy (i.e., one where the insured received some lump sum
for every specific condition) would be thousands of pages long.9 The
ex ante nature of non-indemnity arrangements limits their practical
applicability to health insurance. Instead, indemnity arrangements
are used, which connect coverage and treatment to a "medical neces-
sity" determination.
The flexibility of a medical necessity standard can be a virtue or a
vice for insurers, insureds, and policymakers. Insurance companies,
concerned about paying for ineffective or unnecessary treatments
deemed medically necessary by doctors sympathetic to their patients
or desirous of additional work, have attempted to cabin medical neces-
sity in a variety of ways.10 One approach is contractually to disclaim
categories of treatment not covered by the promise, such as "experi-
mental," "investigative," or "cosmetic" treatments. Another contrac-
tual exception is to exclude specific treatments and limit the length
of services for particular ailments."
To ensure particular depth or breadth of coverage, legislatures
have frequently responded with policy judgments of their own, namely
that X treatment or Y condition (or X category of treatment or Y
category of condition) must be covered for all policies sold in the
state.12 These particularized legislative requirements-which are
sickness rules-are not atomistic and exhaustive judgments about
what a policy must cover, nor, because of the nature of medical treat-
ment, are they usually immune from case-specific distortions.' 3 State
9. There's also the diagnosis problem. A significant portion of medical expendi-
tures involves identifying the problem. It would be nearly impossible to incorporate
that into non-indemnity arrangements.
10. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment
of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992) (examining different approaches
taken by the health insurance industry to rein in the meaning of medical necessity).
11. Id.; see also JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION 542 (2d ed.
2005).
12. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An
Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1361 (2007).
13. Very specific mandates do occur, of course. But the point is that a truly compre-
hensive list of specific mandates immune from case-specific discretion would begin to
approximate a non-indemnity approach.
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benefit mandates are essentially indemnity approaches (requiring some
level of ex post judgment) imbued with legislative policy judgments
about categories of coverage. As a result, they ultimately must rely on
non-sickness rules (i.e., rules limiting coverage discretion, impartial re-
view, and damages) to prevent strategic play by both sides. For a proper
federalism analysis, therefore, it is critical to assess the extent to which
the ACA actually impedes state ability to enact both sickness rules and
non-sickness rules.
II. Sickness Rules
Sickness rules-legal rules governing the motive for pursuing the
health insurance bargain in the first place (i.e., coverage for conditions
and treatments)-understandably attract attention. Anecdotes about
certain treatments not being covered, or, conversely, about how insur-
ance costs are skyrocketing because everything is covered, are fre-
quent. It is therefore unsurprising that the ACA's sickness rules
have attracted a great deal of attention, and the widespread belief ap-
pears to be that the federal government has nationalized all sickness
rules.14 It is our contention that the ACA does leave some room for di-
rect state regulation of sickness rules, and this regulatory freedom is
considerably greater than allowed under ERISA.
A. ACA and Sickness Rules
Like the state approaches to sickness rules discussed above, the
ACA combines an indemnity model with its version of legislative ben-
efit mandates.15 The legislative mandate, however, emanates from
Congress and the secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). The latter is charged by the former with the task of
creating the following sickness rule: with certain exceptions, all
small group and individual policies must cover "essential health bene-
fits" (EHB).16 EHB, in turn, are to be defined by HHS and must include
services in ten legislatively specified areas.' 7
States lack the authority to pass sickness rules that excuse an in-
surance company from selling a policy on an exchange that provides
less than EHB.' 8 Moreover, the ACA provides that, should a state
mandate benefits in excess of EHB, the state will have to pay the in-
surer or the purchasing individual the difference in cost between
covering the federal EHB and the more generous state EHB-plus
14. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 593
(2011) (describing various objectors as decrying a "federal takeover" of health care).
15. We do not attempt in this article to describe the ACA or ERISA generally.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6 (2006) (requiring coverage for "essential health benefits").
17. Id. § 18022(b)(1).
18. Id. §§ 18031(d)(2)(B), 18021, 18022(b).
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requirement.19 We refer to the latter requirement as the "pay-the-
freight" provision. The combined facial effect of the EHB requirement
and the pay-the-freight provision is to achieve a federally mandated
benefit package floor that states cannot go below and are, in practice,
unlikely to go above because they must pay ("defray the cost" in ACA
parlance) for such generosity directly out of state coffers. Hence, the
ACA appears to rob states of their traditional authority to enact sick-
ness rules, specifically mandated benefit rules.
While there is no doubt that state regulatory power is limited by
the ACA floor, the reality of remaining state regulatory authority is
more complex and more favorable to states than frequently described.
First, the discretion of the HHS secretary is significant. In December
2011, HHS issued a bulletin that made clear that HHS aspires to de-
fine EHB in a way that varies with and is sensitive to individual state
judgments about sickness rules. Specifically, the secretary proposed
that EHB in State X be defined with respect to a state "benchmark"
plan, to be chosen by the state.20 One of those benchmark plans in-
cludes plans offered to state employees. Accordingly, EHB would be
significantly defined by state action, and the pay-the-freight provision
would be triggered less than previously imagined. A state would not
have to pay the freight for more generous EHB if, for example, the
state included an additional benefit in its state plans and used that
as its benchmark plan because EHB in the state will be defined by
this benchmark plan.
Certainly the secretary could reverse course and exercise the
agency's discretion in a way less favorable to state judgments about
sickness rules. And perhaps future HHS secretaries may do so; that
is a possibility. But scholars have long realized that between pure fed-
eralization and pure federalism lies cooperative federalism, and that
such cooperation may be driven by political and organizational advan-
tages associated with the national government relying significantly on
19. Id. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i), (ii).
20. The benchmark can be one of four possibilities: "One of the three largest small
group plans in the state by enrollment; one of the three largest state employee health
plans by enrollment; one of the three largest federal employee health plan options by en-
rollment; or the largest HMO plan offered in the state's commercial market by enroll-
ment." CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 10 (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://cciio.
cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential-health&uscore;benefits-bulletin.pdf.
Although states have discretion as to the benchmark chosen, the benchmark is "frozen"
until 2016; they cannot add mandates to the benchmark without incurring a responsibil-
ity to pay the freight. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BUUETIN (Feb. 27,
2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/02172012/ehb-faq-508.pdf. HHS
plans to "revisit" the benchmark issue-and accordingly the effective reach of the pay-the-
freight provision-in 2016. Id.
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state judgment.2 1 Federalism interests, in short, can be served in coop-
erative settings. It is unwise to equate a statute like the ACA, which
vests the secretary with discretion cooperatively to accommodate
state regulatory preferences-a discretion Secretary Sebelius has indi-
cated she wishes to exercise-with a statute like ERISA, which largely
prevents federal agencies from accommodating state preferences.
B. ERISA Preemption and Regulatory Consequences
ERISA's explicit preemption regime consists of a three-step anal-
ysis. State laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans are pre-
empted, 22 but are nonetheless "saved" if they are laws of insurance.23
These first two steps are not straightforward in application, but they
do not provide obvious opportunities for employers to escape state reg-
ulation. It is the third step, in section 514, that provides the opportu-
nity for regulatory choice: the "deemer" clause specifies that an em-
ployee benefit plan cannot be "deemed" by the state to be an insurer
subject to "saved" laws.24
This preemption scheme hinges state authority to regulate em-
ployment-based insurance on whether an employer plan self-insures
(i.e., pays benefits itself to beneficiaries) or uses third-party insurance
to pay beneficiaries. 25 If a plan is self-insured, it is beyond the reach of
any state law that relates to employee benefit plans.26 State sickness
rules undoubtedly relate to employee benefit plans because such rules
seek to govern the content of coverage (and hence the content of the
plan).27 As a result, state sickness rules are preempted for self-insured
21. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Coopera-
tive Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
23. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). A state law will fall within the savings clause if it is "spe-
cifically directed towards entities engaged in insurance" and if it "substantially affect[s]
the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured." Ky. Ass'n of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42 (2003).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006).
25. There are actually two paths to becoming a self-insured plan. A company may
also retain stop-loss insurance, which reimburses the employer for any benefit payouts
above a specified level and thus caps the self-insuring employer's exposure above a cer-
tain level. State authority to regulate stop-loss insurers is uncertain. See, e.g., Russell
Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves
Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETmics 89, 112-15 (2005). The majority rule is
that states cannot regulate stop-loss insurers that backstop employee benefit plans.
Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope
of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 233, 251 (1997).
26. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (self-funded plans are exempt
from saved state laws because of the deemer clause).
27. "A [state] law relates to an employee ... [benefit] plan if it has 'a connection
with or reference to such a plan.'" Id. at 58-59 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)) (New York's Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits
Law were "related to" employee benefit plans because they prohibited such plans from
being structured in a way that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy and mandated
employee benefits, respectively).
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plans. ERISA, moreover, is characterized by a near absence of sickness
rules. With a few very narrow exceptions, no coverage areas or levels
of coverage are mandated. 28 ERISA thus does very little to regulate
the content of the health insurance promise, but it also has a powerful
level of preemption.2 9 As a result of this regulatory vacuum, self-
insured plans, which constitute a majority of plans,30 are free to craft
the content of coverage in almost any way they like.
The above discussion of ERISA's preemptive scope is sufficient to
understand the current severe limits on the ability of states to enact
sickness rules, but it is worth mentioning ERISA's conflict preemption
here as well. Even a saved state law can be preempted if it conflicts
with the purposes of ERISA.3 1 Conflict preemption has not been
used thus far to invalidate state sickness rules; the rules have been al-
lowed to operate on insured plans (but not on self-insured plans).32
It has been used, however, to curtail severely the ability of states to
enact non-sickness rules. Additional causes of action or heads of dam-
ages beyond those provided for in ERISA--even if such would other-
wise be saved-are preempted.3 3 We turn now to a general discussion
of non-sickness rules.
III. Non-Sickness Rules
Health insurance regulation in theory, history, and practice is
about much more than sickness rules. How does the ACA then, from
28. There are very limited mandated benefit provisions, see 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)-(b)
(2006), as well as some limits on preexisting condition exclusions, see id. § 1181; a pro-
hibition on health status discrimination, see id. § 1182; and limited rules pertaining to
continuation of coverage, see id. §§ 1183, 1185; see also Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's
Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 311, 312 (1998) ("ERISA generally monitors only
the implementation or conduct of privately-constituted welfare plans, it does not control
their content.").
29. E.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (broad preemption with little affirmative regulation has created a regulatory
vacuum).
30. See David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Fail-
ure?, 14 CoNN. INS. L.J. 307, 310 (2008) (fifty-five percent of workers are enrolled in
self-insured plans); BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41069, SELF-INSURED
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 4 (2010), available at http://www.achp.orglthemes/ACPH
Main/files/CRSReport-Self-Insured-May2010.pdf (fifty-five percent of private employees
are in self-insured plans); KATHRYN LINEHAN, NAT'L HEALTH PoLIcY FoRuM, SELF-INSURANCE
AND THE PoTENTIAL EFFECTS OF HEALTH REFORM ON THE SMALL-GRouP MARHET 3 (Issue Brief
No. 840, Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB840_PPA
CASmallGroup_12-21-10.pdf (fifty-seven percent of employees are enrolled in a partially
or fully self-insured health plan).
31. Aetna, 542 U.S. at 216-18.
32. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (state
mandated-benefit law was "related to" employee benefit plans but saved and thus not
preempted).
33. See, e.g., Aetna, 542 U.S. at 221 (state law tort claims challenging plan's denial
of benefits were preempted); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990);
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (ERISA preempts state law wrongful
termination claim based on employer no longer wanting to pay for benefits).
79
80 28 ABA JOURNAL OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAw 73 (2012)
a federalism perspective, treat non-sickness rules? The question is ex-
ceptionally broad because virtually any legal rule or regulatory practice
that affects the health care bargain can be considered a non-sickness
rule.
We do not pretend to consider every non-sickness rule that the
ACA does or could address. Instead, we highlight an insufficiently ap-
preciated fact: ERISA was devastating in the effect it had on the abil-
ity of states to enact meaningful non-sickness rules. While the ACA's
infringement on state non-sickness rule authority is not trivial, it
pales in comparison to ERISA. As discussed above, ERISA preempts
everything to which it relates, carves out exceptions, and then carves
out exceptions to the exceptions. In contrast, the ACA's preemptive
posture is conflict rather than field oriented: it broadly saves state
law except for law that "prevent[s] the application" of the ACA. 3 4 We
interpret this to mean the following: the ACA does not generally pre-
empt state laws governing subjects that are not directly addressed by
the ACA. Even regarding state laws on subjects to which the ACA
directly speaks, conflict is not assumed. State law that relates to the
same subject as the ACA may very well be considered a permissible
"supplement" that is not preempted, or, alternatively, may be consid-
ered an exercise of state discretion that the statute tolerates.35
First, the ACA's pay-the-freight provision will not impede state
authority to enact non-sickness rules. As discussed above, the pay-
the-freight provision, while not formal preemption (it is actually for-
mal permission), might be considered to have a practical displacement
effect because it ties legislative freedom to legislative coffers. However,
as we described above, it appears federal authorities will flexibly de-
fine EHB such that state preferences will be incorporated into the
EHB requirement. Moreover, even though EHB includes some non-
sickness rules such as cost-sharing, 36 it refers almost entirely to sick-
ness rules.37
34. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2006) (Title I of the ACA was not intended to preempt any
state law unless such state law "prevented the application of the provisions" of Title I of
the ACA); see also id. § 300gg-23 (state laws not superseded unless they conflict with a
specific requirement).
35. For example, the portion of the ACA speaking to the creation of exchanges com-
mands that informational outreach be "culturally and linguistically" appropriate. Id.
§ 18031(i)(2)(A), (i)(3)(E). It seems fairly obvious that if the federal government is run-
ning an exchange in State X (because the state declined to do so) and the state govern-
ment is running the exchange in State Y, then even if the states have very similar "cul-
tural and linguistic" demographics, the federal information outreach undertaken by the
federally run exchange in State X will not dictate how such outreach needs to occur in
State Y.
36. Id. § 18022(c).
37. See id. § 18022(b)(1) (specifying the general categories that must be included
within EHB).
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Second, the reach of the ACA's formal preemption on non-sickness
rules is likely to be limited because there are some important non-
sickness rules that the ACA specifically avoided regulating. The most
prominent examples, speaking loosely, are rules of remedy. It is mostly
accurate to describe the ACA as a pass-through statute when it comes
to the remedies available to individuals seeking to enforce the insur-
ance deal.3 8 Under the ACA approach, for policies obtained through
employment, ERISA remedial law applies; for policies obtained on
the individual market, state remedial law applies. For many scholars
and commentators, this has gone unrecognized or acknowledged only
in passing. That treatment, almost certainly, is because few under-
stand the degree to which states in the past have attempted to regu-
late remedial rules in the health insurance setting, only to be excluded
from doing so by ERISA's preemptive bubble. A brief review of that
history appropriately frames the real world importance of the fact
that the ACA leaves remedial rules to the states.
For over two decades, the ever-rising cost of health care has forced
actors, policymakers, and judges to pay careful attention to every as-
pect of the health insurance bargain, including non-sickness rules
that might otherwise be thought of as peripheral. For most working
persons who were neither poor nor elderly, the only credible path to
having health insurance was through one's employer,39 an insur-
ance bargain governed by ERISA. The challenge for policymakers-
particularly judges, who were cast unwillingly into a prominent rule-
making role in connection with ERISA health insurance claims-was
that employers were not required to offer health insurance under
ERISA.40 Doing so was optional. Many employers did (and do) offer
health insurance in response to labor market pressures. Employers
were (and are), however, sensitive to any legal rules attending the
employment insurance promise that could make insurance more costly
on average, more uncertain, or both. This is because as insurance be-
comes more costly and more uncertain, it becomes more expensive and
burdensome to administer and much less attractive for employers to
offer. Thus the policy concern: if employer-provided insurance became
too expensive or too difficult to administer predictably, employers
would stop offering it and employees would be left with no plausible
38. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 3, at 1774-77.
39. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based
Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 23, 26 (2001); see also CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, CBO AND JCT's EsTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUM-
BER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE tbl.2 (Mar. 2012), available
at http//www.cbo.gov/sites/defaultlffles/cbofiles/attachments/03-15-ACA-and-insurance_2.
pdf (over 150 million people are covered through employer-based insurance).
40. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648-49 (2010) ("Congress did not
require employers to establish benefit plans in the first place.").
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health insurance alternative. 41 This concern drove judicial articula-
tions of the various legal rules governing ERISA bargains in a direc-
tion that few of ERISA's drafters would have predicted. To wit, a series
of judicial decisions (and legislative acquiescence) embedded the
ERISA health promise in a nest of legal rules that intensely favor em-
ployers and insurance providers.42
Although ERISA requires a fiduciary to act in the interests of
plan beneficiaries, it specifically permits health plan coverage decision
makers to be employees of, or persons otherwise controlled by, the
promisor.43 This creates an agency cost problem: the fiduciary, who
is supposed to be acting in the best interest of the beneficiaries, may
have a financial interest in denying benefits.44 Ordinarily, the judicial
response to the presence of such a conflict would be-using legal rules
such as burdens of proof, interpretative doctrines, standards of review,
or availability of remedies-to make it more difficult for a conflicted
administrator to benefit from a strategic denial. ERISA has been inter-
preted in precisely the opposite way.4 5
Prior to seeking judicial relief, a beneficiary must exhaust internal
appeals before a possibly conflicted administrator,4 6 and a plan may
establish filing deadlines far more demanding than otherwise applica-
41. Cf John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
207, 228 (1990) (positing that the price of stronger protective legal rules in the ERISA
context would be fewer and less generous benefits); Norman Stein, ERISA and the Lim-
its of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 71, 73 (1993) (discussing the challenge of ensur-
ing adequate quality health employment benefits without discouraging employers from
offering benefits at all).
42. Andrew Stumpff Darkness at Noon: Judicial Interpretation May Have Made
Things Worse for Benefit Plan Participants Under ERISA Than Had the Statute Never
Been Enacted, 23 ST. THoMAs L. REV. 221, 223 (2011) ("[Tlhe federal courts have felt them-
selves free ... to resolve a long series of questions under ERISA against plan partici-
pants and in favor of employers.").
43. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126 (1988) ("[T]he statute leaves the
plan sponsor to pick the fiduciary and, if the sponsor pleases, to do it from the ranks of
management. Sponsors routinely exercise this authority.").
44. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency
Costs, and the Future ofHealth Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2297, 2305
(2008) (identifying how ERISA tolerates and even encourages systemic tensions between
fiduciaries and beneficiaries).
45. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perver-
sity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2000) (discussing employers'
continued ability to be opportunistic and self-interested); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No
Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 133
(2009) ("[T]he act has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years to
be in essence an Employers' Security Act."); Stumpff supra note 42, at 231 (the judicial
standard makes it difficult to overturn an administrator's decision).
46. E.g., Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Exhaustion of Administrative Rem-
edies as Prerequisite to Suit Under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
162 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2000).
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ble statutes of limitation. 47 When an administrator's denial is re-
viewed by a court, the court may only set aside the administrator's de-
termination if it was "arbitrary and capricious." 48 The deferential
standard remains even if the administrator was shown to be subject
to a conflict or the administrator had previously behaved arbitrarily
when making the determination. 4 9 With respect to benefit denials,
the damages that may be recovered are limited to the value of the de-
nied benefit; consequential and punitive damages are not permitted.5 0
Claims arising from other breaches of duty, other than benefit denials,
are limited both generally and specifically in scope.5' In general, claim-
ant rights are interpreted narrowly, even in areas that seem, at first
glance, to be minor.
Indeed, because so many people received health care pursuant
to ERISA arrangements, even facially obscure legal rules were
perceived-by states and the U.S. Supreme Court-to be of significant
financial and social importance. Tort subrogation rules are a perfect
example. Tort subrogation refers to insurers' rights (or lack of rights)
to recover monies that the insured has received from a third-party
tortfeasor responsible for the insured's injuries. Because recoveries
(through verdict or settlement) by injured insureds are often not
enough to make the insured whole, subrogation priority matters.
Many states have long regulatory histories of how tort subrogation
should be handled.52 The Supreme Court wrestled with subrogation is-
sues not once, but twice.53 In its more recent decision on the subject,
47. Stumpff, supra note 42, at 234-36 (in the absence of ERISA, plaintiffs would be
subject to statutes of limitations of at least six years, but ERISA allows plans contrac-
tually to set statutes of limitations that are two or three years).
48. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1989) (allowing
the de novo standard to be lowered to abuse of discretion if the terms of the plan give
the decision maker "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to con-
strue the terms of the plan").
49. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1646-47 (2010) (a plan administrator,
whose previous benefit denial had been judicially overturned as arbitrary and capricious,
was nonetheless entitled to deferential standard of review for subsequent denial of the
same benefit); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115 (2008) (applying a discre-
tionary standard of review even after finding the existence of a conflict in the particular
case). A reviewing court is still required to consider an administrator's conflict of interest
as a factor in its review. Id. at 122.
50. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (noting an
absence of rights to additional relief in ERISA).
51. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Af-
fecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 657, 669 n.40 (discussing the "significant
limitations" of other common causes of action).
52. See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing
Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 72-77 (2008) (reviewing the his-
tory of tort subrogation); Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment ofRecovery Between Insured
and Insurer in a Subrogation Case, 29 ToRT & INs. L.J. 803, 807-15 (1994) (cataloguing
state treatments of tort subrogation).
53. Sereboffv. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-W. Life & An-
nuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
83
84 28 ABA JOURNAL OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAw 73 (2012)
the Court held, in effect, that subrogation by contract could be used to
give insurers super-priority on all recoveries (and thus reduce the
amount of money an insured could keep).54
The non-sickness legal rules described above-standards of re-
view, damages, and subrogation-have repeatedly been targets of
state action. The reason is obvious: state legislatures believed that sig-
nificant numbers of their citizens were being adversely affected by the
non-sickness legal rules imposed by ERISA. Currently, for example,
nearly a third of states have enacted laws that do not permit insurers
to use discretionary clauses in insurance policies, which are clauses in
the policy that entitle the administrator of an ERISA plan to deference
from reviewing courts.55 Whether such state laws will survive judicial
scrutiny depends in part on how one interprets the Supreme Court's
existing ERISA preemption jurisprudence.56 Two circuits have held
that such laws survive preemption,57 but one circuit has held that
state law governing the wording of such clauses is preempted,5 8 and
insurance companies will certainly seek to have other circuits weigh
in on the issue.59
In sum, under ERISA, state ability to enact non-sickness rules is
dramatically curtailed. In contrast, none of the non-sickness rules that
have been discussed above are addressed by the ACA, and thus states
remain free under the ACA to enact such rules for private health in-
surance not governed by ERISA. This regulatory freedom is, in our
view, of tremendous practical importance. State legislatures and
state decisional law have long held non-sickness rules to be worthy
of action and resolution, and the Supreme Court has taken numerous
cases to draw the line between state and federal authority.
The historical warrant for the societal importance of non-sickness
rules has an obvious normative explanation. Non-sickness rules that
address remedy speak to a core concern for individuals participating
in any legal regime: fairness. Scholars can and do debate the incentive
and financial effects a burden of proof or damages rule may have, but
health care bargains so obviously involve personal and non-fungible
54. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368.
55. Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. L.
REv. 500, 504-06 (2011).
56. See id. at 507-14 (evaluating whether ERISA preempted discretionary clause
regulation and concluding "the majority of state regulation .. . will survive preemption").
57. Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2009) (ERISA's reme-
dial provisions do not preempt state discretionary clause ban); Am. Council of Life Insur-
ers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (allowing Michigan to prohibit discretionary
clauses under ERISA's savings provision).
58. Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 2009) (Utah's
rule is not saved due to a lack of "substantial effect on risk pooling").
59. "States within the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
have taken steps to regulate discretionary clauses." Pathak, supra note 55, at 502 n.13.
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stakes that perceived fairness assumes a heightened importance. 60
Legal rules that shift the bargain too far in the favor of employers
and insurers are frequently the subject of state efforts because of legis-
latures' perceptions that their citizens are being treated unfairly, re-
gardless of the alleged financial savings associated with strict rules.
We have little doubt that an enormous majority of people who pur-
chase and maintain health insurance intuitively ask themselves, in
addition to whether the policy is affordable, two questions: (1) will
this policy give me the medical treatment I need when I am sick and
(2) if there is a dispute about what I'm entitled to, will there be
some way to resolve it fairly?61 If the answers to either of those ques-
tions is no, complaints to local authorities will be made, and the result
will be state action motivated by a desire to make insurance bargains
fair.
IV. Conclusion
No one credibly suggests that the ACA is not a significant deploy-
ment of federal power; it is. But a federalism-in-fact analysis of the
ACA's effect on the ability of states to regulate sickness and non-
sickness rules reveals that the ACA limits state power considerably
less than its detractors suggest. This is particularly true when suffi-
cient attention is paid to the fact that the regulation of private health
insurance had already been significantly federalized by ERISA.
60. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Patients' Rights in Managed Care-Exit, Voice, and
Choice, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 210, 212 (1997). Cf Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care
Morally, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1464 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About
Health Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 344-45, 383 (2000) (discussing the importance of,
and challenge in assuring, fairness in health insurance coverage disputes).
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